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suggest that the academic scientist, in exploring new areas, has laid the human race open to devastation either by human or interplanetary enemies-the doctor's madness, then, is merely a suitable way of expressing a conviction that the scientist's idle curiosity has shaken itself loose from prudence or principle.
In fact, one writer, well aware of the fantastic and polemical quality of these stories, endorses them as a legitimate way of lashing back at the institution of science. Reed (1984) If it is evident that these stories are a device for damning science, then we must ask which idioms of science are used to symbolize the evil of science.
Let us say that three kinds of idioms could be used to represent science: (1) the physical paraphernalia of science, (2) scientific knowledge, and (3) the people who are scientists. The physical equipment is a usual element of mad scientist stories, for their title characters often need laboratories in which to perform their diabolical deeds. However, the role of their equipment is peculiar, and to appreciate its role, we must first recognize a notable difference between Gothic horror and science fiction. The latter depicts the instruments of laboratories and spaceships with exquisite detail, showing exactly how they look and how they work. Witness the way every rivet and cathode is visually caressed in series like Star Trek and Star Wars, or in the novels of Tom Clancy. The reason why science fiction celebrates technology this way is that it assumes that technology is equivalent to progress and intelligence, regardless of the moral strengths or weaknesses of the good guys and bad guys who employ it. Consequently, says Sontag (1966, 216) , a science fiction story earns much of its credibility from the visual fidelity of its scientific equipment and the role of that equipment in the story.
By contrast, mad scientist stories, as exercises in antirationalism, must challenge the belief that just because this stuff is scientific, it must be valuable. Yet they cannot claim that the equipment itself is evil, for antirationalism, especially Gothic horror, locates evil in the heart of man or in nature itself. If scientific equipment is neither inherently good nor inherently evil, then it must be insignificant to both morality and narrative. How, then, should it be represented? By default it comes to be depicted ambiguously, illogically, and mysteriously, in other words, irrationally. Thus are the experiments, the laboratories, the drugs, the rays, and the forces that are handled by mad scientists. The physical artifacts of their science are presented as the miscellaneous material junk of alchemists, illogically connected and barely justified.
Examples are the ambiguity of the creation scene in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein or the equally mysterious processes of creation in these films: The Golem, Metropolis, Frankenstein, and Bride of Frankenstein. So, too, in Stevenson's ([1886] 1984) Jekyll and Hyde, the pharmacology of Dr. Jekyll has barely any physical details but many ambiguous references to a mysterious salt. Yet this irrational way of representing the paraphernalia of science has a very important effect. It empties the rationalism out of the tangible evidence of science, so that the physical paraphernalia is included in the view that all reality is ambiguous, illogical, and mysterious. Thus does antirationalism tame rationalist science.
Next, there is scientific knowledge. If science can be represented in terms of knowledge and that knowledge is shown to be evil, then the case is made.
As Dr. Janos Rukh (in The Invisible Ray) and innumerable subsequent mad scientists learn, "There are some things man is not meant to know." However, it is difficult to represent abstract knowledge in tangible terms. Rotwang (from Metropolis), Caligari, and others possess knowledge in the form of dusty old volumes with worn pages, but the books themselves are not nearly as frightening as the ways in which their respective knowledge affects people. To depict knowledge in terms of its effects, instead of its intellectual substance, two strategies are at hand. In one, we learn that abstract knowledge is inherently evil because of the evidence that it corrupts people. In this category are all the mad scientist stories in which young people are innocent until exposed to scientific knowledge. According to the second strategy, if the person who uses or produces knowledge is depraved, then so is that knowledge. So then scientists are either those who have been corrupted by knowledge (e.g., Victor Frankenstein) or those who use it to corrupt others (such as the psychiatrist who torments the teenager in I Was A Teenage Werewolf).
In either way of saying that knowledge is evil, it remains abstract until manifested in personalities. Ultimately the evil of science is depicted and condemned principally in terms of the character of people who are scientists. Says Sontag (1966) , "When the fear of science is paramount... the evil has no attribution beyond that of the perverse will of an individual scientist" (p. 223). That their intentions are evil, that they feel no remorse for their misdeeds, that they ought to know better than to commit their diabolical deeds-these features of personal morality are combined to create the personalities of the mad scientists who then personify the evil of the institution of science. (Incidentally, the conscience of science can also be personified: Dr. Waldman in the film Frankenstein, Dr. Lanyon in most versions of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, and the Bela Lugosi character in The Invisible Ray are ethical scientists who caution mad scientists to cease their experiments and return to conventional morality. However, this is often a device for underlining the amorality of the mad scientists, who typically reject the ethical advice, and sometimes murder those who personify it.) I will return to this topic and give it more substance, but first I need to introduce the next problem, namely, that this crucial element in the cultural critique of science has been changing over many decades, in the sense that fictional mad scientists have been getting increasingly amoral. If so, then a problematic relationship is getting worse, in which case it is necessary to identify a pattern of change and specify its cause.
Questions of Historical Change
In examining this topic over time, the most basic question is whether in fact mad scientist stories experience substantive change. In one way of thinking, they do not: These stories tell the same old basic narrative again and again. This paradigm of stasis, whether referring to literature or film or both, is rooted in analysis by genre and archetype. According to the more conservative understanding of genre, certain stable fundamentals can be described so that works of human creativity, regardless of when they were produced, can be classified in one genre or another. Like a typology according to Linnaeus, analysis by genre assumes that there is a stable order that can be mapped in terms of static characteristics. Similarly, an archetype is an unchanging model of an unchanging reality.
The paradigm of stasis, as applied to mad scientist stories, can be read in the words of Baxter (1970), who notes "the ritualized nature of [Hollywood films] in which the use of traditional elements takes priority over the imaginative creation of new ones" (p. 49). Also, Basalla (1976) summarizes his historical review of mad scientists in comic books by concluding that the "portrayal of the scientist is remarkably consistent with an older tradition that saw the scientist as a dangerous figure who tended toward mental instability and social irresponsibility (p. 263). Bunnell (1984) defines Gothic horror in terms of three salient static features (namely, emotional involvement, the duality of reality, and certain stock motifs; pp. 80-82). Prawer (1980) concludes that by the 1930s, mad scientist films had crystallized into "strictly defined character-types and limited situations" (pp. 3840).
To be fair, these authors note some historical changes, but still they launch their analyses from initial assumptions of stasis. "The mad scientist stereotype ... stems from an ancient heritage" (Weart 1988, 143) ; it has medieval roots, it springs from medieval prototypes [that is, wizards, sorcerers, and alchemists], and it still embodies a medieval spirit (Brustein 1958, 288) ; it hearkens back to premodem tales (Basalla 1976, 263) .
On the other hand, there are commentaries that acknowledge that mad scientist stories do indeed change. Among these views, it is necessary to distinguish two separate explanations of change. In the first, it is assumed that events occurring within scientific circles produce changes in mad scientist stories, thereby implying that these narratives are an external cultural reflection of an internalist reality. The mutant-monster movies of the 1950s, for example, Them, are obviously dependent upon knowledge of atomic testing. In his history of psychiatrists in films, M. Fleming (1985) shows (Smeed 1975, 14, 17) .
In Christopher Marlowe's play, The Tragicall Historie of Doctor Faustus (first performed in 1594), Faust's intellectual curiosity ruined him, but it also ennobled him. Similarly, G. E. Lessing and other eighteenth-century interpreters made Faust a hero of human rationalism and a martyr to its spirit. According to their view, "He was a wholehearted and devoted seeker after Truth who was misunderstood and turned into a bogeyman by the ignorant and the prejudiced" (Smeed 1975, 2 ).
Yet another turning point was Goethe's 1832 version of Faust. Here the appreciation of knowledge for the sake of knowledge was discarded and replaced by a quest for experience, that is, knowledge rooted in action, and which has consequences for action (Smeed 1975, 20-21) . The interaction of knowledge and action is good, suggested Goethe, but only to the point that it does not transcend the metaphysical limits to one's spiritual being. This is a delicate point, better rendered by Heller (1969) These features are common moral standards. Because they are so common and so real, fictional mad scientists are more believable when their personalities are constructed from some combination of the three. We can say that every fictional mad scientist possesses at least one evil aspect from among those standards. Some, however, have benevolent or admirable personality traits generously mixed in with their bad aspects and so have rich moral character; but for other mad scientists, the good traits are either neglected or greatly abbreviated, so that these persons are relatively depraved. This is not a Manichaean division between good guys and bad guys. It is a more sensitive distinction between bad guys whose character is tempered by good traits that are well represented and bad guys whose good traits are negligible. Then there is pace. With a text, the reader can pause-between chapters, between paragraphs, wherever-to think about the personalities of the characters. Savoring the text is one of the pleasures of reading, so it is well worth the author's effort to give his or her characters some rich personalities. But with film, the viewer has no such control over pace unless he or she is using a videocassette recorder. The viewer receives a film at its own pace, with no opportunity to pause, let alone to savor the work. There is much less reason to dwell on the richness of personalities, and much more reason to emphasize action, which keeps the plot moving.
And so, said Ingmar Bergman, "the irrational dimension which is the heart of a literary work is often untranslatable" from text to film (Murray 1972, 294) . Film depicts much about the characters' experiences but little about their minds (cited in Murray 1972, 112) .
I trust that the implications are obvious. The mad scientists who come to life on the printed page are relatively rich characters, while those on the screen are generally more shallow. What this means historically is that the audiences that met mad scientists through the texts of Gothic horror often found some personality traits to appreciate in them, but the audiences that encounter them in the cinema see much more simplistic personifications of the evil of science, even if they bear the same names as their literary referents, that is, Frankenstein, Jekyll, Moreau, and so on.
Another feature of cinematic characterization is this: In some films, the mad scientist has to be especially depraved, so that the character of the hero is defined, by default, in opposition to the amorality of the scientist. In the 1989 production of Batman, the title character is morally ambiguous, enigmatic, and slightly sadistic. He dwells in a neo-Weimar cityscape of hypocrisy, confusion, decay, and relativism. Until very late in the story, it is unclear why Batman is motivated to wage a private war against crime; even the police wonder which side he is on. It is not until a master criminal-scientist uses his scientific knowledge to make a terrible toxin that the righteous dimensions of Batman's crusade become clear. Batman is a hero, not because he has a hero's personality, but because he is the antidote to the criminal-scientist, whose depravity is the landmark against which the hero is defined. Subsequent to the process of text-to-film adaptation, there is a second process that also changes the moral character of mad scientists, making them even worse. This is the process of sequels: the Return of.. ., Son of... , and Revenge of... films. It is important to note that the featured attraction in such stories is not the title character of the mad scientist but, rather, the violent monster, the diabolical invention, or the special visual effects, such as miniaturization or invisibility. The mad scientist or a successor must appear in the film to animate the real attraction but this character's role is of little importance thereafter. The mad scientists become more or less interchangeable with their successors. As such they are ciphers who neither require nor possess much moral character. Thus the process of serialization further debases mad scientists by making them more shallow. It is in this process, rather than in the adaptation, that a given mad scientist, or a family of mad scientists, becomes a simple stereotype with no moral dimension (Reed 1984, 108) .
To (Glut 1978, 157) . Invisibility was the star attraction, and it had a long career, but the career of Dr. Jack Griffin was short, as was that of each of his successor scientists.
To restate my thesis: The moral character of mad scientists, as portrayed in fiction and film, has been changing, both in the process of text-to-film adaptation and in the process of making film sequels. The pattern is that a given mad scientist becomes madder as the adaptation process sheds much of the intangible quality of moral character from the text, and he becomes more shallow as the sequel process reduces the mad scientist to a succession of ciphers who play perfunctory roles. Ironically, this kind of moral deterioration cannot be attributed to a sustained intellectual critique of science, even though each mad scientist story is an individual critique of scientists or scientific knowledge. Rather, the two processes that tie the various stories together in a pattern of moral deterioration are external to the institution of science. Their source is the art of making films.
At this point I subject my thesis to a deeper, more sustained treatment by walking the two greatest of mad scientists through it. Let us consider the respective moral characters of Frankenstein and Jekyll.
The Changing Moral Character of Frankenstein
The golem was a creature of artificial life from medieval Jewish folklore (Goldsmith 1981, 19-20) . In the earlier golem stories, learned rabbis used their knowledge to shape humanoid beings from clay, then used their spiritual wisdom to invest them with life for a righteous purpose. In the most famous golem story, Rabbi Loew of Prague (a real person who lived in the seventeenth century) made a golem to protect the Jewish ghetto from anti-Semitic violence. As stories of artificial life, the golem tales inevitably addressed the theme of "man's conceit in competing with God" (Goldsmith 1981, 16) , which was resolved with the rabbi's voluntarily returning the golem to inanimate clay when its mission was accomplished, thereby recognizing the limits of the rabbi's authority over life. The important point here, then, is that these miracle-working Jews, like Loew, always used their powers wisely; they realized that moral responsibility begins, not ends, with creation, and they destroyed their creatures when they threatened to roam beyond their makers' control. (Friedman 1984, 132) In the later golem stories, from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, impious rabbis created golems to perform menial tasks like hewing wood and hauling water. Subsequently their golems turned violent, forcing their makers to end their lives unhappily (Goldsmith 1981 Frankenstein began the work of assembling the creature's bride, then realized the likely consequences of his science. Whereas he formerly hoped that two such creatures would solve the anguish and violence of one, he later realized that the two, male and female, might beget a terrible race of violent monsters. He destroyed the human parts he had collected to make the bride. That triggered the creature to more violence, killing Frankenstein's best friend and, in a macabre exchange, Frankenstein's bride. This at last brought Frankenstein to accept his ultimate responsibility: He must destroy the being he had made, regardless of the consequences, even to himself.
Shelley's novel was a progression from foolish irresponsibility, through increasing responsibility for one's actions, to ultimate responsibility. The scientist painfully "realized that moral responsibility begins, not ends, with creation," as Friedman (1984, 132) says of the golem makers. And although the book was generously laced with evil and violence, their ultimate source was neither the creature nor the scientist. Rather, scientific knowledge, which was both inherently dangerous and powerfully seductive, generated the crimes that punctuated this tale. As he began his story, the scientist cautioned the narrator to "learn from Dr. Frankenstein's isolation from civilization and its moral influence was extreme. "At night the winds howl in the mountains," he wrote. "There is no one here. Prying eyes can't peer into my secret" (Mank 1981, 1) . James Whale's Frankenstein represented all the best and all the worst of horror films. Suspense, emotion, violence, and counterviolence combined to make a thrilling story, yet they also inflicted their inevitable damage on the moral character of the mad scientist. Whereas in the novel Frankenstein's intentions were somewhat naive, in the film they were purely arrogant, for example, to humble the scientists who had denounced his work. As to remorse and responsibility, Dr. Frankenstein delegated them to Waldman. Much of the novel concerned Frankenstein's interior turmoil, but the fastpaced film allowed him no time to reflect on himself. The scientist's level of maturity was especially changed, from Victor Frankenstein's college-boy folly to Dr. Henry Frankenstein's careful planning based on much scientific experience. In all three features of moral character, the mad scientist who represented the evil of science was distinctly less empathetic and more dangerous in the film than in the novel, so that this story became a more severe critique of science than it had been previously.
Then According to the plot of this novella, a respectable scientist released the evil personality within himself. At first he enjoyed the pleasures that the dark self brought, but then he recognized the consequences, regretted his experiments, and attempted to suppress the evil character. He struggled to regain his own good worth, but ultimately his experiment led to his own destruction. It is critically important that he recovered his moral bearings and that he had a reservoir of goodness that gave him the strength to struggle heroically against Hyde.
Stevenson depicted Jekyll's initial goodness in terms of altruistic intent. If the good and the evil sides of the human personality could but be housed in separate identities, life would be relieved of all that was unbearable; the unjust might go his way, delivered from the aspirations and remorse of his more upright twin; and the just could walk steadfastly and securely on his upward path, doing the good things in which he found his pleasure, and no longer exposed to disgrace and penitence by the hands of this extraneous evil. It was the curse of mankind that these incongruous faggots were thus bound together .... How, then, were they dissociated? (Stevenson [1886] There have also been numerous derivative works that reinterpreted Jekyll's story under other names. One of the most sophisticated was Altered States, in which a Harvard psychologist does reckless personality-transforming experiments on himself with hallucinogenic mental exercises. His counterpart to Hyde is a violent australopithecine, which implies that ancestral killer-apes still live within us and that we can regress to that ugly condition if we try hard enough. Also there is a senior colleague who warns the psychologist to cease his unholy research and who spouts such wisdom as, "This is a phenomenon. We must study it phenomenologically!" Predictably, the psychologist rejects the moral cautions. Also predictably, the scientific research leads to uncontrolled violence. Whereas all the scientific authority at Harvard fails to restrain the protagonist in his Hyde-australopithecine state, it is the love of a good woman-the psychologist's estranged wife-that redeems him from his subhuman mischief.
There is one more point of reference to consider here: In David Wickes's Jekyll and Hyde, broadcast on American television in January 1990, Jekyll was a widower who became involved with his married sister-in-law. In the form of Jekyll he rejected her advances, but in the form of Hyde he brutally raped her. Yet when he explained the Jekyll-and-Hyde connection to her, she forgave his actions. It seems to me that this was the most extreme equivocation of sexual ethics in the entire Jekyll-and-Hyde tradition, for it suggested that a brutal rape was excusable on the grounds that the rapist and the victim really loved each other.
Whereas 
Cultural Critiques of Science
If the personality of Dr. Frankenstein symbolizes science and that personality loses the good traits it once had, if the moral character of Dr. Jekyll embodies the same thing and its heroic qualities are replaced by moral ambiguity, and if the processes of moral deterioration and simplification are common to many stories of mad scientists, then the changes in this device for damning science deserve to be noted. It matters not that these changes are unplanned and uncoordinated. It matters very much, however, that they assume a predictable pattern.
Scientists are accustomed to critiques of science by articulate wellmeaning intellectuals like C. P. Snow and Lewis Mumford. But outside the circles of academic etiquette there is another kind of critique, a kind of Gothic subterranean reality, which reveals a visceral fear of science. Periodic warnings by Handlin (1972) Morison (1969) cautions us that "science can no longer be content to present itself as an activity independent of the rest of society, governed by its own rules and directed by the inner dynamics of its own processes" (p. 156). In that spirit I urge the reader to understand that Enlightenment rationalism has been shadowed by a strong antirationalism that remains powerful. Its manifestations include the feelings that science is downright dangerous to one's spiritual well-being and that science is too secular, in the sense that scientists have escaped the restraints of Judeo-Christian morality.
Stories of mad scientists, whether textual or cinematic, constitute an extremely effective antirationalist critique of science. They thrill their audiences by brewing together suspense, horror, violence, and heroism and by uniting those features under the premise that most scientists are dangerous. Untrue, perhaps; preposterous, perhaps; low-brow, perhaps. But nevertheless effective.
Inevitably, we must look into the dark heart of Gothic horror to understand how it commissions its mad scientists to tell the world that science is evil. We must recognize that this critique is becoming sharper as the mad scientists are becoming more amoral. Although the actions of a few real scientists inspire some of the personalities of fictional scientists, other features of their moral character arise from text-to-film adaptations and from sequels to those adaptations.
Technically, text-to-film adaptation is no worse for mad scientists than for cowboys in Westerns or lovers in romances. But the moral consequences are exceptional for mad scientists. There are some bad guys in the other two genres, but Westerns usually do not condemn cowboy life in general, and romances are not ordinarily dedicated to the theme that love is evil. Because mad scientist stories are indeed condemnations of rationalist science and because the personality of the scientist is the principal symbol of the evil of science, any change in that character's personality is likely to change the critique. If the scientist's moral character worsens because of adaptation or serialization, then so does the moral character of science itself, as posited by a particular narrative.
Historically, this means that the antirationalist critique of science became harsher in nineteenth-century stage adaptations than in the original prose. The critique was harsher still when films were launched from the stage adaptations, creating definitive cinematic personalities for Doctors Frankenstein, Jekyll, Griffin (The Invisible Man), Moreau, and others. After that, most of their sequels further simplified their moral character and thus further debased the moral worth of science as measured by these movies.
True, these stories are partly an external reflection of an internal reality of science, for indeed there are some actual monsters like Mengele and Mesmer behind Szell and Caligari and their brethren. Ideally, then, if real scientists behave better than Mengele and Mesmer and if nonscientists know they do, then this cultural critique of science ought to change for the better. But if artistic processes have made mad scientists much more depraved, then regardless of how moral or immoral scientists actually are, the moral careers of Doctors Frankenstein, Jekyll, Caligari, and others remain particularly worrisome, for their source is so independent of scientific reality. In fact, this problem is like a runaway golem. Scientists may have inspired it, but they cannot control it.
